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We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and
budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting
-- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems.
We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant,
SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount
of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving
more than a billion dollars.
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Since being pioneered by the U.S. in 1994, simultaneous ascending auctions have become a
common mechanism to allocate spectrum rights.1 Spectrum auctions can involve billions of
dollars and companies bidding in these auctions regularly create specialized bidding teams
and hire experts to develop bidding strategies. Nevertheless, the results can be surprising. In
the FCC￿ s auction of Advanced Wireless Service spectrum, price arbitrage failed so dramat-
ically that one new entrant was able to purchase essentially nationwide coverage for about
a third (more than a billion dollars) less than what incumbent carriers paid for equivalent
spectrum in the same auction (Table 1). At the same time, the other prospective nationwide
entrant exited the auction early and ￿led a letter with the FCC claiming that the auction
rules disadvantaged new entrants!
Results of this sort raise questions for economists. Does the apparent failure of the Law
of One Price indicate a fundamental ￿ aw in auction design? If not, why must such auctions
be complicated? What are the issues that create strategic complexity for bidders? And to
what extent can the tools of economic theory provide insights that facilitate e⁄ective bidding
in highly complex environments?
We start by explaining some of the reasons why large spectrum auctions are necessarily
complicated, and why the Law of One Price can fail so dramatically. We emphasize two
di¢ culties facing bidders: exposure problems, which occur when bidders wish to acquire
complementary licenses, and budget constraints, which we argue are ubiquitous. We explain
why these di¢ culties make bidding in simultaneous ascending auctions complicated, and also
why they would complicate bidding in other auction designs.
Exposure problems create fundamental di¢ culties for a new entrant seeking to compete
head-to-head with incumbent nationwide wireless carriers in the US. Such an entrant needs to
acquire adequate bandwidth in every major metropolitan area, but because licenses covering
cities or regions are sold individually, the entrant could commit to spending billions of dollars
on certain spectrum licenses before discovering that the total price for the bundle of licenses
it seeks makes the whole entry una⁄ordable or unpro￿table. It could then be left to dispose
1Among the countries that have used such auctions to allocate spectrum are the US, Canada, Mexico,
Australia, New Zealand, India, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
1of extensive holdings at ￿re-sale prices.2
The exposure problem, as well as the di¢ culties created by budget constraints, arise
because there is uncertainty about the ￿nal auction prices. A bidder who knew what ￿nal
prices would be would face no exposure problem and have no di¢ culty deciding how to
allocate its limited budget. Information early in the auction about the ￿nal auction prices
can therefore be extremely valuable to bidders.
Remarkably, it turns out that in large spectrum auctions, information su¢ cient to fore-
cast ￿nal price levels is often available early in the auction. We document this previously
unnoticed pattern using data from large FCC auctions. We also provide a simple theory
that is broadly consistent with the facts. According to our theory, it is bidders￿budgets, as
opposed to their license values, that determine average prices in a spectrum auction.
We then explore the dynamics of simultaneous ascending auctions, in which prices of
various licenses may follow a variety of increasing paths. We show that bidders facing
exposure problems and budget constraints may wish to manipulate the price paths so larger
licenses reach their ￿nal prices earlier in the auction than smaller ones. We describe the
tactics available to bidders to accomplish that. And we explain the sometimes con￿ icting
interests of new entrants regarding auction timing. Finally, we explain how bidders facing
competitors who must deal with exposure and budget problems can disadvantage them by
manipulating the price path in other ways.
We illustrate the practical application of these ideas using the experience of the U.S. Ad-
vanced Wireless Service auction mentioned above. In that auction, held in the late summer
of 2006, the FCC auctioned 90 MHz of nationwide spectrum divided into 1122 licenses. The
sale, in which winning bids ultimately totalled 13.9 billion dollars, attracted 168 bidders in-
cluding two potential nationwide entrants: a consortium of cable television companies and a
rival consortium of satellite television companies. Because of budget and exposure problems
the potential entrants faced by far the most di¢ cult strategic decisions.
During the auction, the satellite consortium exited earlier than any other major bidder,
without buying a single license. The cable consortium, bidding under the name SpectrumCo,
2This ￿exposure problem￿has been the driving force behind attempts to create new auctions in which
bidders can bid for packages of licenses. Essays in the book by Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg (2005) deal
with various aspects of this mechanism design problem.
2acquired licenses covering 91.2 percent of the U.S. population at prices that were much lower
than those paid by the other large buyers. At the per unit prices paid by the major incumbent
carriers, SpectrumCo￿ s licenses would have cost more than 3.5 billion dollars ￿ as it worked
out, SpectrumCo paid less than 2.4 billion dollars.3 While luck surely contributed to this
outcome, we describe in the ￿nal section of the paper how the elements of auction strategy
analyzed here, speci￿cally tactics to control the pace of the auction and decisions guided by
budget-based price forecasts, put SpectrumCo in a position to be lucky.
2 Why Spectrum Auctions Are Complicated
Spectrum auctions in the United States and other countries have typically been conducted
using a simultaneous multiple round format. There are both practical and theoretical ratio-
nales for this choice. For instance, under certain conditions a simultaneous ascending auction
results in competitive market-clearing prices. Suppose that bidders view licenses as substi-
tutes and that bidding is ￿straightforward,￿meaning that every round each bidder makes
o⁄ers on the set of licenses that give it the most surplus at current prices. Milgrom (2000)
proved that prices will then rise and ultimately stop at approximate competitive equilibrium
levels (see also Gul and Stacchetti, 2000).
As an example, consider an auction like the British 3G auction held in 1999. Five
national licenses were sold, with no bidder being allowed to buy more than one. Two
licenses were bigger than the other three. In this auction, straightforward bidding, with each
bidder making the qualifying o⁄er that would give it the most surplus if the auction ended
immediately, was a sensible strategy. The simple design helped allocate the spectrum to
those willing to pay the most.
In auctions where bidders can buy multiple items, however, both bidders and auction
designers face more serious challenges. For starters, to keep the auction moving forward the
FCC employs an ￿activity rule￿requiring each bidder to make o⁄ers in each round on at least
3The most common unit for measuring the size of a spectrum license or a collection of licenses is MHz-pop,
which is calculated by multiplying the bandwidth in MHz by the population covered. Due to both spectrum
scarcity and di⁄erential build-out costs, prices of large urban areas are higher in MHz-pop, so our calculation
may somewhat understate SpectrumCo￿ s price di⁄erential.
3a certain percentage of the ￿quantity￿of spectrum which it is eligible to buy, the percentage
increasing across two or three auction stages. If a bidder makes o⁄ers on a smaller amount
of spectrum, its eligibility is reduced.
While the reasons for such an activity rule are compelling, the rule makes it more di¢ cult
for bidders to move back and forth between say a 30 MHz license and a 10 MHz license
covering the same geographic area but only absorbing a third as much eligibility. Even
moving back and forth between a 30 MHz license and three 10 MHz licenses can be tricky, as
doing so may require being outbid on the three smaller licenses simultaneously. This barrier
to arbitrage helps create the possibility of large price di⁄erences among nearly identical
spectrum footprints.
Activity rules are one reason that in spectrum auctions bidding activity often starts on
the larger licenses and then moves to the smaller licenses (though there are also strategic
reasons for this, as we will explain below). Figure 1 illustrates the general pattern for the
AWS auction. The two curves plot the round-by-round fraction of bids, by number, that
are made on licenses that are larger or smaller than the median license, according to the
FCC￿ s quantity measure (￿points￿ ). In this auction, the larger licenses on average saw more
bidding for the ￿rst 50 or so rounds, after which the pattern reversed.4
Of course, there is much more variation in the underlying data. Some small markets clear
early, and some large markets can clear quite late. To provide a sense of the variability, Figure
2 plots the round of the last bid for each license against the size of the license for both the
AWS auction and FCC Auction 35, another large auction. What is particularly important to
note here is the wide range of rounds in which di⁄erent licenses received their ￿nal bids. It is
exactly this dispersion that creates problems for a bidder trying to assemble a package and
worried about a failed aggregation. We will show below that it also gives these bidders an
incentive to manage the pace of the auction, rather than bidding in straightforward fashion.
Our model will assume that a bidder who needs two licenses and acquires only one cannot
resell its license. That assumption requires some justi￿cation. After all, the winning bidder
could try after the auction to sell to the bidder that placed the ￿nal competing bid on the
4The ￿gure ends after Round 82, at which point there were 75 bids. In later rounds, there were never
more than 50 bids and generally far fewer, and the fractions plotted in the chart ￿ uctuate widely due to the
small number of bids.
4unwanted license, often only one increment below the sale price. The losing bidder, however,
may have redirected its limited budget elsewhere, or met its needs some other way, or it may
also have attempted and failed to assemble a collection of licenses, eliminating its interest
in the single license. Furthermore, even if there is continued interest, the underbidder will
know that it o⁄ered the highest alternative price, putting it in a strong bargaining position.
So while unwanted licenses do often have some salvage value, rational bidders anticipate
incurring signi￿cant losses in trying to re-sell them.
A second important complication for bidders who cannot forecast ￿nal prices arises from
limited budgets. Suppose a bidder is targeting two particular licenses that it believes would
be pro￿table at prices up to 200 million and 100 million dollars, respectively, but has been
able to raise only 150 million dollars in capital. If the rules require that the bidder remain
active on both licenses or else lose the eligibility to purchase both, and the current price of
each license is 50 million, what should the bidder do? If it continues bidding on only the
more valuable license, it passes up the opportunity to win both. But if it bids for both,
it might win the less valuable license in the current round and later ￿nd that its budget
constraint blocks it from buying the other license, which may be a much better bargain.
Theoretically, some of the these di¢ culties could be addressed using alternative auction
designs. For instance, a natural way to address the exposure problem is to permit package
bids as well as bids on individual licenses.5 Package bidding, however, comes with its own
di¢ culties including complexity problems (there may be very many potential packages!),
coordination problems (bidders need to make bids that ￿t together in reasonable ways) and
strategic problems which depend on the particular auction rules.
To illustrate some of the issues, consider the Vickrey auction. In a Vickrey auction,
each bidder can make o⁄ers on any license packages, and licenses are allocated to maximize
the total bidder value assuming that bids re￿ ect true value. Each bidder receives a surplus
equal to the di⁄erence between the maximized value conditional on its participation and
absent its participation. So the price a bidder pays equals its stated value for the licenses it
receives, less its incremental contribution to auction surplus. Under well known assumptions
5The FCC￿ s recent auction of 700 MHz spectrum allowed a very limited set of package bids. The upcoming
British auction of WiMax spectrum will use an even more ambitious package bidding design.
5bidders have an incentive to bid straightforwardly in the Vickrey auction and the allocation
is e¢ cient.
Unfortunately the Vickrey auction su⁄ers from very serious problems, including low rev-
enue and vulnerability to collusion. Say a package bidder o⁄ers 10 for licenses A and B (but
nothing for the individual licenses). If two individual bidders o⁄ered 9 for each of the individ-
ual licenses then each would win at a price of 1! If the bidders each had true values of 6 this
would harm revenues; if they had true values of 2 then e¢ ciency would be harmed as well.
While in most markets collusion is di¢ cult because it requires the cooperation of almost all
competitors and particularly of the highest bidders, in Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanisms it
is not unusual that a successful collusion can be carried out by just two bidders.6
Budget constraints also create problems for a Vickrey auction. Consider the bidder above
that valued license A at 200 million and license B at 100 million, and had a budget of 150
million. If its bids report its maximum price for each license or bundle of licenses, it will
o⁄er 150 for A alone, 100 for B alone, and 150 for the pair. The mechanism will treat it
exactly the same as a bidder who places no value on B in the event it receives A, so that the
bidder will never win both licenses.7 Evidently, bidding its maximum price can be a very
poor strategy for a budget-constrained bidder in a Vickrey auction.
Finally, a drawback of Vickrey auctions and other ￿one-shot￿auctions is that they limit
the ability of bidders to learn from the bids of others. For example, a bidder may think that
it is the most e¢ cient operator in market A and therefore ￿should￿win a license there. It
may also think that it probably ￿should￿lose out in market B. Finally, it may believe that a
license in market B will be worth exactly as much to it as a license in market A. However, it
has an extremely noisy estimate of what that value is. How should this bidder proceed in a
Vickrey auction? Should it bid the same amount for each license, believing they are equally
valuable? What if its value estimates are much higher than most of its competitors? Will it
overspend and buy licenses where it is not the e¢ cient operator? On the other hand, what
if its estimates are too low? Will it be shut out of licenses that it knows it should win?
6This example was presented by Jeremy Bulow at the FCC￿ s May 2000 conference on combinatorial
bidding. More complete descriptions of the faults of the Vickrey auction can be found in Ausubel and
Milgrom (2005) and Rothkopf (2007).
7Hegeman (2008) studies the possibility of designing an e¢ cient auction for budget constrained bidders.
6These problems have led many economists concerned with auction design to favor multiple
round auction formats when there is substantial price and value uncertainty.8 Given this, we
now take up how bidders in simultaneous multiple round auctions can deal with the strategic
complexities, particularly the exposure and budget problems.
3 Price Forecasts and Bidder Budgets
3.1 The Price Forecasting Surprise
For a bidder facing a serious exposure problem, such as SpectrumCo in the AWS auction,
the central strategic question is whether and when to exit the auction. An accurate early
prediction of ￿nal prices can allow the bidder to avoid both kinds of exit mistakes, namely,
the mistake of exiting too early, when ￿nal prices turn out to be low enough for successful
entry, and the mistake of exiting too late, when ￿nal prices are found to be too high only
after the bidder has won some licenses. Accurate price prediction is also valuable for bidders
without an exposure problem but facing serious budget constraints, because it allows them
to focus their spending on the licenses that will prove to be the best values.
Spectrum auction prices, however, can be hard to predict before the auction. The spec-
trum o⁄ered in each auction often has its own unique characteristics or restrictions imposed
by the regulator, and even when an attempt is made to control for these di⁄erences, spec-
trum prices have ￿ uctuated wildly over time. Table 2 shows the average prices per MHz-pop
for 9 FCC spectrum auctions between 1995 and 2008. The variation is dramatic and much
of it not easily explained by the nature of the spectrum for sale or industry conditions. Even
forecasts made just prior to an auction by investment banks tend to have high variance. Prior
to the AWS auction, analyst estimates of auction revenue ranged from $7 to $15 billion. For
the recent 700 MHz auction, they varied over an enormous range ￿from $10 to $30 billion.9
8There are also important considerations, such as avoiding collusion or encouraging entry, that can weigh
against multiple round formats or at least in favor of a shorter number of rounds (Klemperer, 2002). Also,
because our focus here is on spectrum auctions run by governments we assume that the seller has a great
deal of power in setting the rules. In other situations, buyers may be able to take actions that disrupt or
pre-empt an auction, or may refuse to participate unless they deem the rules su¢ ciently favorable to their
interests.
9In both of these cases, the ￿nal auction revenue fell between the extremes. In other cases, such as in
some of the European 3G auctions, revenues have greatly exceeded or fallen short of analyst expectations.
7Can information from early bidding usefully reduce the uncertainty? In an ascending
auction for a single item, bidders who quit early provide some statistical information, but
the only certain conclusion when the price reaches p is that the ￿nal price will be no lower.
With multiple items being sold, more information may be available. High prices per MHz-
pop for licenses that have seen early bidding can be a clue about the values bidders place on
licenses that have not yet seen much activity. In fact, we have found that an even simpler
approach proves surprisingly powerful for forecasting prices and guiding bidding decisions.
This approach focuses attention not on bidder values, which are so emphasized in traditional
auction theory, but on bidder budgets.
In major spectrum auctions, even large corporations need to raise or put aside money in
advance to ￿nance their spectrum purchases. Many of these companies also have a broad set
of target licenses. If these licenses are substitutes and the budget constraint is binding, the
bidder￿ s optimal purchase will involve spending its whole budget or nearly so. Of course not
every bidder falls into this category. For bidders with tight budgets and narrow interests, or
for entrants with all-or-nothing goals, rising prices could lead them to spend zero once the
prices of target licenses rise too high.
If bidders in the ￿rst category account for enough of the money in the auction, a previously
unexplored pattern becomes identi￿able in the data. De￿ne a bidder￿ s exposure to be the
sum of all of its bids in a given round, including its standing high bids from the prior round
and all of its new bids in the current round, whether provisionally winning or not. This is
the largest amount that a bidder might have to pay if all of its bids were to become winning.
If a bidder faces a binding budget constraint and has broad interests, then as prices increase
from round to round, its total exposure will eventually level o⁄at an amount approximating
its budget. If all bidders were to fall in this category, then the total exposure of all bidders in
the auction would rise to the level of the aggregate bidder budgets and level o⁄, forecasting
the ￿nal auction prices. As prices rise, bidders will narrow the set of licenses on which they
bid, the identities of the provisionally winning bidders on various licenses will change, and
total winning bids will continue to rise, but ￿nal total winning bids will be forecast early
and well by total exposure.
The same idea can be expressed using a supply-demand analysis. Assume that bidders
8are required to make o⁄ers each round on about as much spectrum as they are interested in
buying. Then we have
Exposure = Total Price x
Demand
Supply
For example, if at current prices all the licenses sell for $10 billion in the auction and
the potential winning bids or exposure in a round is $15 billion, then at the current prices
the (price-adjusted) quantity of spectrum demanded is 1.5 times supply. The equilibrium
total price, where demand equals supply, will be determined by the aggregate elasticity of
demand. The budget hypothesis tells us that by this stage of the auction many bidders will
be constrained by their budgets and so have an (uncompensated) elasticity of demand of
￿1.10
In this example, say that when the total price was $15 billion demand was composed of
budget bidders o⁄ering $10 billion and other bidders o⁄ering $5 billion. Assume that the
non-budget bidders exhibit constant elasticity of demand in aggregate. Because the budget
bidders anchor elasticity at ￿1, revenue will be relatively close to the exposure of $15 billion
for a wide range of elasticity. If for example the non-budget bidders have an elasticity
between ￿2:19 and ￿:48, ￿nal revenue will be between $13.5 billion and $16.5 billion, or
within 10 percent of exposure. By contrast, if there were no budget bidding and the same
range of possibility of elasticity, then ￿nal prices could only be estimated within a factor
of two ￿ between $12.15 billion and $24.30 billion. Clearly, if the budget hypothesis has
validity it is a tremendous aid to forecasting.
Is auction data consistent with the budget hypothesis? Figure 3 shows the pattern of
total exposure and total prices in Auction 35, which was the largest US spectrum auction
in the years before the AWS auction. At round 10, total revenue in the auction was still
less than one-third of their eventual level, but total exposure had approached its ￿nal level.
10Technically, two small adjustments to this formula are needed when applying to real spectrum auctions.
First, bidders are typically required to make bids for only 95 percent of the spectrum they might still demand,
even in the ￿nal stage of an auction, causing the formula to potentially understate demand. Second, some
exposure is accounted for by bids that were at a price one increment below the current price, and not all those
bids would be renewed at the current price, causing the formula to potentially overstate demand. Because
these two adjustments to the supply-demand calculation work in opposite directions they partially cancel
one another.
9Forecasting that total revenue would be equal to total exposure from that point forward
would lead to errors that are mostly less than 10%, close enough to guide some of the most
critical strategic calculations. A potential new entrant who decided, based on that forecast,
that prices would become too high could stop bidding while prices were still far below their
￿nal levels. The entrant would likely be topped on most or all of its provisionally winning
bids and, even if it were not, its early withdrawal would mean that it acquired licenses at
only a small fraction of the average auction price, greatly reducing any expected loss on
resale.
Figure 4 shows the similar pattern of exposure and revenue for the AWS auction. Again,
total exposure provides a remarkably accurate early forecast for total prices in the auction.
Exposure peaked at $14.2 billion in round 11 and ￿nal auction revenue was $13.9 billion.
The large drop in exposure in round 13 is largely due to the exit of Wireless DBS, a joint
venture of the two satellite TV companies Echostar and DirecTV. In Round 12, Wireless
DBS￿ s exposure was $2.025 billion; it dropped to $196 million in round 13 and subsequently
to zero. From round 15 onwards, however, a bidder who estimated ￿nal total prices to be
equal to current total exposure would never have made an error larger than 10%, despite the
fact that the total price was still 40% below its ￿nal value.
In the AWS auction, the ability to forecast prices early in the auction had another key
implication. Early bidding in that auction focused almost entirely on the 40 MHz of spectrum
that was divided into large REAG licenses, before turning to the 50 MHz of spectrum that
was divided into smaller EA and CMA licenses. By round 15, it was possible to forecast that
cumulative high bids on the REAG licenses were so high relative to the total budgets in the
auction that the smaller licenses would sell for a steep discount. This allowed SpectrumCo,
alone among the major bidders, to make an early switch to the smaller licenses.
Further evidence on the budget constraint theory can be seen in Figure 5, which plots
the exposure of the largest individual bidders in Auction 35 and the AWS auction. These
￿gures suggest more than one pattern of bidding. In Auction 35, the behavior of AT&T,
Cingular, and many of the smaller bidders suggests a binding budget that could have been
inferred early on. Verizon eventually may have hit a budget constraint, but if so not until
relatively late in the auction. Similarly, all of the major winners in the AWS auction ￿
10T-Mobile, Verizon, SpectrumCo, MetroPCS, Cingular, Leap/Denali and Barat ￿ exhibit
budget-constrained patterns. Yet there are also clear exceptions. Two large bidders, the
Dolans and Wireless DBS, stand out. Wireless DBS was an all-or-nothing entrant. The
Dolans were bidding on New York licenses, presumably to complement their New York cable
franchise Cablevision. When the prices became prohibitive, these bidders found no desirable
substitutes upon which to spend their budgets, so they left the auction.
Using exposure to forecast prices would have worked well in many past FCC auctions,
but not in every case. Exposure in smaller auctions sometimes has peaked well above ￿nal
revenue, as one might expect with independent ascending auctions not tied together by a
budget constraint. Figure 6 shows the ratio of maximum auction exposure to ￿nal auction
revenue for ten previous FCC auctions. For the larger auctions, exposure does not rise much
above ten percent over ￿nal auction revenue, but there is greater variance for the smaller
auctions. We note, however, that in some of these auctions exposure peaked for just one or
two rounds. Figure 6 also displays, using smaller hollow squares, the same exposure to ￿nal
revenue plot using instead the third highest round of auction exposure. From this plot, we
see that exposure remained well above ￿nal revenue for a signi￿cant period in only one of
the ten auctions.
What Figure 6 does not show is that in these auctions, as in Auction 35 and the AWS
auction, exposure also climbed much faster than revenue and so provided a usefully early
forecast of ￿nal auction revenues. We document this phenomenon in Table 3 which, for each
auction, reports (1) the round in which revenue reached 90% of its ￿nal level, (2) the round
in which exposure reached 90% of ￿nal revenue, and (3) the ratio of revenue in that round
to ￿nal revenue. The choice of 90% is, of course, arbitrary, but it is a reasonable choice
because 10% is the smallest bid increment that the FCC used for individual licenses in the
AWS auction. Table 3 shows that in nine of ten cases auction exposure reached 90% of ￿nal
revenue at a point where auction revenue was under half its ￿nal level.
To understand why a forecast is valuable for a new nation-wide entrant, suppose the
entrant has a target budget, perhaps with 10% upward ￿ exibility. From the evidence above,
even a very simple budget-forecast strategy, such as ￿exit the auction only when the fore-
casted price for a national footprint based on the total exposure price exceeds the target
11budget,￿would have performed extremely well. It rarely would have recommended an inap-
propriate exit, and when exit was recommended, prices would have been quite low relative
to the auction close.
Of course, we are not advocating a mechanical approach to bidding, and the results of the
recent FCC Auction 73 (for 700 MHz spectrum) provide one reason. In that auction, exposure
peaked at $25.6 billion in round 27, but the ￿nal auction revenue was just $19.6 billion,
suggesting a dramatic failure of the budget theory. The gap, however, was attributable in
large part to a single bidder, Google, which had a provisionally winning bid of $4.7 billion
on a national package license through round 27, but exited the auction when its bid was
topped by Verizon. The prospect of exactly this behavior had been widely discussed even
before the auction, because of Google￿ s unusual role and objectives.11
3.2 Why Bidder Budgets?
Why do the teams representing large bidders in spectrum auctions face budget constraints?
Super￿cially, the answer appears simple. Bidding in a spectrum auction requires a substantial
amount of cash-on-hand, and raising this money from external capital markets takes time. In
turn the capital markets may want to deliver money against a promised acquisition. If this
pattern is optimal, then it is hardly surprising that the same pattern of capital budgeting
could emerge in companies funding a division bidding in a spectrum auction.
The harder questions concern why this pattern of capital budgeting prevails and why
prices vary so widely over time. In practice, incumbent ￿rms can often substitute for ad-
ditional spectrum by using existing spectrum more intensively, by building more cell sites
or by using other spectrum enhancing technologies. It seems unlikely that the shadow cost
of spectrum ￿ uctuates so substantially over time. Nevertheless, evidence from behavior in
spectrum auctions suggests that bidding teams often face budget constraints and yet have
considerable freedom in deciding which licenses to buy within their ￿xed budgets. Such a
11Google had lobbied the FCC to include an ￿open access￿band in the auction. Under the auction rules, if
the FCC-set $4.6 billion reserve were met, the winner of that band would be required to allow the operation
of devices and software from independent providers (such as Google). If the reserve were not met, then the
open-access provision would be removed and the licenses made available for re-auction. Google participated
in the auction until the reserve was met and the open-access provision was triggered. It then immediately
ceased bidding.
12pattern might be rationalized if the bidding team has better information about the relative
values of di⁄erent licenses but also has either di⁄erent incentives or di⁄erent beliefs about
factors like demand growth that a⁄ect the value of the entire business.12
4 Controlling the Pace of the Auction
By far the most dramatic moment in the AWS auction occurred in round 9, when SpectrumCo
made a jump bid doubling the prices of the large REAG licenses covering the Northeast and
Western United States. This move, which we referred to at the time as the ￿shake-out
tactic,￿was intended to resolve competitive uncertainty and favorably align relative prices
in the auction. In particular, it aimed to alleviate the risk that SpectrumCo might end up
purchasing the licenses across the interior U.S. but fail to purchase licenses covering the large
cities on the coasts.
In this section, we explain why bidders facing exposure or budget problems almost al-
ways have an incentive to control the relative pace of price increases of di⁄erent items in a
simultaneous ascending auction.13 In the process, we identify optimal bidding patterns in a
stylized model of the auction, characterize the welfare e⁄ects, and then explain the practical
implications.
4.1 An Illustrative Example
Consider a bidder who is interested in acquiring two licenses, A and B. It is willing to pay
10 for the package but regards each individual license separately as worthless. It does not
know the values that others place on the licenses, but thinks that the amount it will have to
pay to win license A is uniformly distributed between 0 and 10, and the amount to win B is
independent and uniformly distributed between 0 and 6. No package bidding is possible.
12Our own experience in these auctions indicates that one di¢ culty in relying solely on net present value
estimates of license values is that these kinds of estimates are extremely sensitive to assumptions about
interest rates, demand growth, market share, and so on. For example, we know of a successful bidder that
prior to a major FCC auction estimated the value of a Chicago area license at $30 per covered person, plus
or minus $60. With such a wide range of values, a binding budget constraint may be a sensible way to focus
a bidding team on relative values.
13Several papers explain why bidders may have a signalling motive to use a jump bid (e.g. Avery, 1998;
Brusco and Lopomo, 2002; Zheng, 2006). The rationale we describe is quite di⁄erent.
13Participating in the auction is pro￿table in expectation ￿ even a brute force strategy of
buying both licenses regardless of the price earns an expected pro￿t of 2 ￿ but exactly how
pro￿table depends on the bidding dynamics.
Suppose for example that license B sells ￿rst. If the buyer purchases B for pB, it will
certainly want to buy A, but could lose money overall if the price of A goes above 10 ￿ pB.
Its best strategy is to bid for B only until the price reaches 5, at which point it would make
zero in expectation from winning. This strategy gives expected pro￿t of 2.0833. It is better
for the bidder if A sells ￿rst. Its optimal strategy is then to bid for A until its price reaches
7, allowing it an ex ante expected pro￿t of 2.45.
In a simultaneous ascending auction the buyer ideally would like to see the price of A
rise faster than B until it either wins a license or decides to exit. If no license clears earlier,
the buyer would have the price of A reach 6 and the price of B reach 2 at exactly the same
time, and then quit. This raises its expected pro￿t to 2.533.
Intuitively, the buyer prefers that prices rise in a way that conveys as much information
as possible before it must commit to buy or not. That tends to make the buyer prefer a
faster increase in the price of the more uncertain license. In this case, there is initially more
uncertainty about the price of license A and, so long as the other bidders remain active, the
buyer￿ s best policy is to raise the prices until they reach (6,2). At that price vector, the
remaining uncertainty about both license prices is the same and winning either license A at
price 6 or license B at price 2 leads to expected pro￿ts of zero.
This illustrates a general principle: on the buyer￿ s most preferred price path, she exits
at a point where it would get exactly zero expected pro￿t from winning either license at its
current price, given its conditional expectation about the other license price. This principle,
which can be inferred from reasoning about the ￿rst-order optimality condition, also applies
if the bidder needs to assemble multiple licenses, or if the licenses have some stand-alone
value.14
14While we will focus on controlling prices to manage the exposure problem, we note that a bidder with
additive license values may want to do the same if it has a budget constraint. To illustrate, consider a bidder
that values license 1 at 2v and license 2 at v; but has a budget b with v < b < 3v. Ideally, this bidder would
like the price of license 1 to rise to (b + v)=2 by the time the price on the second license reaches (b ￿ v)=2:
It would be happy to buy either license at a lower price, regardless of what would be required to buy the
other. Once the target prices are reached, however, the buyer cannot a⁄ord both licenses, and simply wants
to maintain a constant price di⁄erence of v between the two licenses. That is, the bidder wants to keep the
144.2 Managing the Exposure Problem
We now consider a more general case where an entrant is willing to pay a premium for two
licenses over the sum of its individual license valuations. Let the entrant￿ s value for license
i individually be vi while the value of the package is v12 > v1 + v2. Suppose the entrant
has a budget of b, and for simplicity that b ￿ v12. There is one competitor on each license
(we will generalize this later), and they have independent unknown values c1 and c2; drawn
from distributions Fi(￿) with densities fi(￿). We will assume that these competitors bid
￿straightforwardly,￿that is, each remains active on its license until the license price exceeds
its valuation.
We consider a hypothetical setting where the license prices, denoted p1 and p2, rise
continuously and the package bidder can choose the price path as a function of the activity
of the other bidders. At any price p, the package bidder knows both p and the prior bidding
by the competitors; observing the latter is the same as observing min(ci;pi) for i = 1;2.
Denote this historical information by h(p). A strategy for the entrant is a pair ￿ = (P;d)
where P is a price path which may depend on the drop-out decisions by other bidders and d
is a decision rule specifying whether to exit or continue bidding on each license at each price
pair depending on which other bidders still remain.
An expected-pro￿t maximizing entrant will continue bidding on each individual license
i at least until the price reaches the entrant￿ s stand-alone value vi and will never buy i at
a price exceeding its maximum marginal value: v12 ￿ vj. A graphical approach will help
explain the optimal decision rule d￿ in more detail. First, suppose that the price pair (p1;p2)
is reached and the individual bidder on license i then exits the auction. Conditional on that
event, the entrant expects a pro￿t of
￿i (p1;p2) = vi ￿ pi + Qj(p1;p2): (1)
The ￿nal term represents the ￿option value￿of continued bidding on license j; having pur-





maxf0;(v12 ￿ vi ￿ cj)gdFj (cjjcj ￿ pj): (2)
Suppose that the entrant selects a path of prices passing through the point (p1;p2) and
plans to stop bidding on both licenses at that point if both competitors are still active. For
a given pj, increasing pi slightly raises the entrant￿ s pro￿t if ￿i (p1;p2) > 0 and reduces it if
￿i (p1;p2) < 0, so optimality requires that
￿1(p1;p2) = 0 and ￿2(p1;p2) = 0. (3)
Figure 7 depicts the two curves satisfying equations (3). To understand the picture,
observe ￿rst that if pi < vi, then since Qj(pi;pj) ￿ 0, ￿i > 0, that is, continuing to bid
on license i is pro￿table. If pi = vi, there is no immediate payo⁄ to winning license i, but
nevertheless ￿i > 0 provided that there is a chance of pro￿ting from the addition of license
j, i.e. if pj < v12 ￿ vi. Similarly, it may be desirable to purchase license i even if pi > vi
provided pj is su¢ ciently low. In this region, the curve satisfying ￿i = 0 slopes down because
￿i is strictly decreasing in both license prices.
The two curves satisfying (3) must cross at some p￿ satisfying vi < p￿
i < v12 ￿ vj. The
reason is that if pi ￿ v12 ￿ vj, then Qj(pi;pj) = 0 and so ￿i < 0: buying license i could not
possibly lead to positive expected pro￿ts. Also, ￿i > 0 for su¢ ciently small pi. In Figure 7,
the crossing point is unique, which must be the case given the following condition.










Condition (U) states that any crossing point, the curve de￿ned by ￿1 = 0 is strictly
steeper than the curve de￿ned by ￿2 = 0. As both curves slope down, this means at most
one intersection.
We can now state our ￿rst result.
15This ￿option value￿analogy can be made precise. If the entrant￿ s budget b is su¢ ciently large, then
Qj(pi;pj) = E[maxf0;v12 ￿ vi ￿ cjgjcj > pj], which is the value of a put option on cj with exercise price
v12 ￿ vi, conditional on cj ￿ pj.
16Proposition 1 Assume that (U) holds. The optimal strategies for the entrant are charac-
terized as follows: Raise prices (along any path) to the unique price pair p￿ = (p￿
1;p￿
2) that
solves (3); drop out at p￿ if both competitors are still active at that
Proposition 2 point; otherwise, if the individual bidder for license i is the ￿rst to drop
out, continue bidding on license j until pj = minfb ￿ pi;v12 ￿ vig.
Proof. Recall that any strategy in which the entrant plans its initial exit at a price p such
that pj > v12 ￿ vi cannot be optimal. So we can restrict ourselves to strategies that involve
an initial exit price vector ^ p satisfying b pj ￿ v12 ￿ vi for j = 1;2.
Conditional on the initial exit being planned for price vector ^ p and other decisions made
optimally, the path of prices leading to ^ p is irrelevant. Why? If both individual bidders have
values above ^ p, they will not exit along any path to ^ p, so the path does not a⁄ect payo⁄s.
If one individual bidder, say i, has a value below ^ pi, it will exit along any path to ^ p and its
exit will make it optimal for the entrant to remain bidding on j at least to v12 ￿ vi ￿ ^ pj.
By the same logic, if both individual bidders have values below ^ p, the entrant will win both
licenses regardless of the path toward ^ p.
Finally, we argue that a price path leading to initial exit at p￿ is best. Consider a strategy
with initial exit at ^ p 6= p￿, where ￿i < 0 for some i. As all paths to ^ p yield equivalent payo⁄,
consider the path where just prior to reaching ^ p, only the price of license i is rising (such
a path must exist because ￿i < 0 at ^ p, then ^ pi > 0). The entrant does better to follow
this path and drop out a bit before ^ p. Next, consider a strategy with initial exit at prices
^ p satisfying ￿i > 0 and ￿j ￿ 0. Rather than exit at ^ p, the entrant does better to follow a
continuation path in which the price rises just on i, which makes strictly higher expected
pro￿ts than exiting on one or both licenses at ^ p. So ￿1 (^ p) = ￿2 (^ p) = 0 at any optimum.
Q.E.D.
What does the result imply about the direction in which the entrant should push prices?
A simple case is where the individual bidder valuations have a constant hazard rate, the same
on both licenses. In this case, the entrant￿ s optimal exit point satis￿es: p￿
1 ￿ v1 = p￿
2 ￿ v2.
That is, the bidder will manage prices to equalize the exposure risk across the two licenses.
17More generally, the entrant tries to limit exposure risk in the following sense. Along an
optimal price path, the entrant may purchase a license at an immediate loss (i.e. at a price
pi > vi), but it never makes a purchase that leads to negative conditional expected pro￿t.
That is, along an optimal path, so long as the entrant is active on both licenses, we must
have ￿1;￿2 ￿ 0. In fact, this characterizes the optimal choice p￿. For consider any strictly
increasing price path that does not pass through p￿. The entrant would always want to
continue bidding beyond the point where ￿i = 0 for some i, and ￿j > 0 for some j, risking a
small expected loss if bidder i drops ￿rst in favor of a larger expected gain if bidder j drops
￿rst.
The case with multiple individual bidders is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that (U) holds and that there is at least one individual bidder for
each license and at least two for some license, with all individual values independently and
continuously distributed. An optimal strategy for the entrant is to increase the license prices
at any rate until the lowest price b p at which there is just one other remaining bidder for each
license. Then: (1) if ￿1(b p);￿2(b p) < 0, exit; (2) if ￿1(b p);￿2(b p) ￿ 0, follow the strategy of
Proposition 1; or (3) if ￿i(b p) ￿ 0;￿j(b p) > 0, increase price pj either until ￿j(b pi;pj) = 0,
in which case exit, or until the remaining j competitor drops out, in which case increase pi
until it reaches min(b ￿ pi;v12 ￿ vj).
Proof. In searching for an optimal strategy, we can restrict attention to strategies where
the entrant never makes an initial exit until b p, i.e. until there is a single competitor on each
license. To see this, consider a strategy that after some history calls for the entrant to exit
with multiple bidders left on license i, i.e. with pi < b pi. Instead, increase pi up to b pi and
execute the same exit. This alternative achieves the same payo⁄.16
Consider continuation play from b p. For cases (1) and (2), optimal behavior follows
from the proof of Proposition 1 (just as if b p = (0;0)). The new case is the one with
￿i(b p) ￿ 0;￿j(b p) > 0. Mimicking the proof of Proposition 1 establishes that there is some
e p > b p such that any path from b p through e p is part of an optimal strategy. If e pi > b pi, then
16This is obvious is the planned exit was on both licenses or just license i. If the planned exit was on just
license j, and the continuation strategy from the initial price pair called for an exit on i between pi and b pi,
the entrant can exit on i at b pi and guarantee the same (zero) payo⁄.
18one optimal path passes through the price pair (b pi; e pj) and then continues to e p, but that
path has a lower payo⁄ than the same path stopped at (b pi; e pj). This contradiction implies
that at the optimum, e pi = b pi. Therefore at the optimum the entrant increases only the price
pj, and up to the point where ￿j(b pi;pj) = 0. If the last j competitor exits as pj rises, the
optimal continuation on license i follows Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
After the AWS auction, the FCC moved to limit the ability of bidders to engage in jump
bidding, which can be a key tool for controlling the pace of the auction. Was the FCC right
to do that? Does bidder control of the price path as described damage e¢ ciency?
In the preceding model, regardless of the price path, the entrant￿ s total payment for any
licenses it acquires is the sum of its competitors￿values, that is, the entrant pays the social
opportunity cost of any licenses it acquires. Consequently, an entrant that maximizes its
own net pro￿ts necessarily maximizes the net auction surplus.
Proposition 4 If the entrant controls the feasible path of prices to maximize its expected
pro￿ts, then any e⁄ective restriction on the entrant￿ s control reduces expected total surplus
from the auction.
This result should be interpreted with some caveats. First, an auctioneer often has
criteria other than total surplus, including revenue, future product market competition, and
so forth. Even focusing on total surplus, the model itself omits two potentially relevant
considerations that may cause bidders to manipulate prices in a way that distorts e¢ ciency.
One is illustrated by the AWS auction, in which there were two potential national en-
trants, SpectrumCo and Wireless DBS, not just one as speci￿ed in our model. In general,
two entrants with di⁄erent values will prefer di⁄erent price paths, and they cannot both
maximize auction surplus. Moreover, an entrant who could choose the price path to maxi-
mize its own net pro￿t would not internalize the e⁄ect of its choice on the pro￿ts and entry
decisions of the second entrant, so its choice would not generally be e¢ cient.17
Even in the model with just one entrant, we have treated individual bidders as passive
automata and not as strategic players. A strategic individual bidder for license j might seek
17One case where the presence of multiple entrants does not create problems for e¢ ciency in our model is
if there are two entrants and only one individual bidder competing for, say, license 1. If the entrants are not
budget constrained, any price path will result in an e¢ cient allocation.
19a path of prices to disadvantage the entrant. Suppose, for instance, that the entrant has
zero value for an individual license and a value of 2 for the pair, that the individual bidder
for license 1 has a value of 1, and that the individual bidder for license 2 has an uncertain
value c which is uniformly distributed on [0;3].
If the price of license 2 climbs ￿rst, the entrant will bid up to 1 and will win both licenses
if that is e¢ cient. Bidder 2 will win a license only when c > 1 and its pro￿t will be c ￿ 1.
If bidder 2 could force the price of license 1 to rise ￿rst, and force its price to rise ￿rst to
1, the entrant would ￿nd it unpro￿table to bid beyond 1=2, allowing bidder 2 to acquire its
desired license at a price of zero. Bidders can have a similar incentive to drive up the price
of non-desired licenses even if there are no value complementarities, but some bidders are
budget constrained. In that way, bidding up the price of license 1 may reduce competition
on license 2.
4.3 Managing Prices in Practice
A di⁄erence between our stylized model and a real auction is that in reality prices do not
rise continuously, and a buyer cannot perfectly control the pace of the auction. Nevertheless,
the FCC rules do give bidders several ways to in￿ uence pacing.
(1) Holding back demand: In the early rounds of FCC auctions, bidders need not bid on
all the spectrum they are eligible to win. For example, early in the $7 billion ￿AB￿auction
of 1995, bidders could maintain their eligibility by making o⁄ers on just one third as much
spectrum. So bidders could simply defer bidding on many target properties.
(2) Parking. To the extent that activity rules do require a bidder to place bids, it can
￿park￿eligibility by bidding on non-target licenses, planning to switch later to the licenses of
main interest. This tactic, too, can a⁄ect the relative rate of price increase among licenses.
(3) Jump bidding: Though seldom used as a strategic tool prior to the AWS auction,
jump bids can similarly raise the price on one license ahead of others. A jump bid made
early in the auction can be ine⁄ective in altering the relative rates of price increase, because
any changes can be undone by competitors￿responses. A jump bid late in the auction entails
some risk of overpaying. This makes the timing and analysis of jump bids subtle, but far
from impossible.
205 The AWS Auction
The AWS auction provides an illustration of how jump bidding and the strategic considera-
tions analyzed above can play out in practice. The FCC o⁄ered for sale 90 MHz of spectrum
covering all of the United States and its territories, divided into 1122 licenses. One 20 MHz
layer of spectrum (the ￿A￿band) was divided into 734 Cellular Market Area (CMA) licenses.
Two other layers, one 20 MHz and the other 10 MHz (the ￿B￿and ￿C￿bands), were carved
into 176 Economic Area (EA) licenses. Finally, three spectrum layers of 10, 10 and 20 MHz
respectively (the ￿D￿ , ￿E￿and ￿F￿bands), were divided into 12 Regional (REAG) licenses.
Traditional thinking about the exposure problem highlights large licenses as o⁄ering
the most protection, so the large REAG licenses appeared to o⁄er the easiest route to a
nationwide aggregation. Of the 12 licenses covering the US and its territories, a footprint
covering the contiguous U.S. required just 6 ￿ the Northeast, Southeast, Great Lakes,
Mississippi Valley, Central and West regions. The other 6 licenses in each REAG band
covered Alaska, Hawaii and various U.S. territories (e.g. American Samoa), and had much
lower values. Based on historical prices, the REAG licenses in di⁄erent regions were not
expected to settle at equal prices, either in absolute terms or on a per MHz-pop basis. For
example, the price of a license covering the densely populated Northeast would normally
be much higher even on a per MHz-pop basis than, say, the price of the Mississippi Valley
license.
The auction attracted 168 bidders, including incumbent carriers Verizon, Cingular, T-
Mobile, MetroPCS, and Leap Wireless, and the two potential national entrants: SpectrumCo
(the cable consortium) and Wireless DBS (the satellite TV consortium). Bidding was ex-
pected to be ￿erce. Prior to the auction, rough analysis based on budgets strongly suggested
that at most one of the national entrants would be able to complete a successful aggregation,
and also that the entrants potentially had quite similar resources. As a further complica-
tion, there was some concern that incumbent carriers might try to deter entry by purchasing
large amounts of the spectrum in key markets such as New York and Los Angeles. Success-
ful national entry without these markets was thought to be impossible, partly because the
scarcity of spectrum in these highly-populated markets makes it di¢ cult to buy after-market
21spectrum or negotiate a roaming agreement.
We described above how early bidding tends to focus on the largest, most valuable li-
censes. The AWS auction was no exception: initial bidding centered on the REAG licenses.
Nevertheless, a somewhat unusual pattern emerged. The FCC had set essentially uniform
starting prices for the licenses (with prices measured on a per MHZ-pop basis), with the same
minimum percentage price increments for all licenses that attracted high activity. With al-
most all bids being made at the minimum price increment, prices across the REAG licenses
remained uniform even as they climbed far from their starting values.18
Of course the ￿nal market clearing prices were unlikely to be anywhere near uniform. If
the early pattern persisted, bidding would likely close on the less valuable REAG licenses
such as those covering the Mississippi valley and the Mountain states long before the ￿nal
prices were determined for the coveted licenses covering the northeast and west coast.
From the perspective of a potential entrant, this timing posed a serious danger. Spec-
trumCo could wind up winning licenses covering the interior U.S., only to ￿nd that price
of spectrum covering the coasts had become prohibitive. A further concern was that Spec-
trumCo and Wireless DBS could each win licenses in the interior U.S., virtually guaranteeing
that at least one of them would was left with an economically untenable partial footprint.
And, with minimum prices rising at 20% per round and rounds occurring every two hours,
these dangers were increasingly imminent.
At this point SpectrumCo executed its ￿shake-out￿tactic, submitting a maximal jump
bid on all of the Northeast and West REAG licenses. It submitted these bids on the ￿rst
round of the Monday morning after the auction started, timed to give competitors only a few
hours to respond. The jump bids doubled the prices on the Northeast and West licenses (from
roughly $0.20 per MHz-pop to $0.40), but SpectrumCo did not assign a large probability
to these bids becoming winning. While it would have been satis￿ed with that outcome, the
primary goal was to resolve as much uncertainty as possible and align relative prices.
The jump bids left Wireless DBS in a position of having to raise their bids and loss
exposure by hundreds of millions of dollars with just two hours notice and in unexpected
18Small rural licenses had starting prices that were somewhat discounted ($0.03 per MHz-pop, as opposed
to $0.05 for all the other licenses). The minimum increment rules also meant that licenses receiving di⁄erent
numbers of bids did not rise in lockstep.
22circumstances. Moreover, the shift in relative prices may not have favored their business
model, as the satellite television subscriber base skews more toward rural areas than that of
cable operators. Wireless DBS responded at ￿rst by buying time, taking its ￿rst waiver, and
then by exiting the auction.19 Meanwhile SpectrumCo￿ s bids were topped and the REAG
prices climbed still higher.
SpectrumCo￿ s attention turned next to its own decision about whether to remain active
and how to acquire its desired footprint at the lowest possible price. Forecasting based on
budget exposure played a central role. At the end of the day on Monday (following Round
12), auction exposure had peaked at $14.2 billion. Meanwhile prices across the spectrum
bands had diverged so remarkably that the high bids on the 40 MHz of REAG licenses, just
44% of the total spectrum in each area, totaled slightly over $5 billion, while the high bids on
the other 50 MHz totaled just $737 million (see Figure 8). According to the budget model,
the REAG licenses appeared likely to wind up over-priced relative to the smaller EA and
CMA licenses unless there was a dramatic shift in bidding intensity. In response, SpectrumCo
switched its bidding to the smaller licenses in the ￿rst round on Tuesday morning.20
By mid-day Wednesday, the budget model indicated that SpectrumCo￿ s switch might be
rewarded handsomely. The cumulative high bids on the 40 MHz of REAG licenses reached
$7.6 billion, versus just $2.3 billion for the 50 MHz of EA and CMA licenses. Given the
earlier exposure peak, the budget forecast implied that the smaller licenses were unlikely to
sell for more than $6.7 billion in total, or $0.47 per MHz-pop compared to the current and
still-rising price of $0.67 per MHz-pop for the REAG licenses.
It is tempting to ask why other bidders, who had access to precisely the same information,
did not identify the same opportunity. Is this evidence of ￿irrationality￿in the bidding?
Only in the same sense that chess grandmasters are irrational because they change their
19This sequence of events does not imply that Wireless DBS erred. It faced, on very short notice, the
need to make a multibillion dollar investment decision in an unprecedented auction environment with the
timing pattern of bids reversed from what it likely expected. The risks may have been magni￿ed because
the expensive licenses were not necessarily in the consortium￿ s strongest markets. And, even if its bidding
team could sort out the situation in real time, continuing to bid would have required educating and then
getting approval from the senior management of the two consortium companies within just hours, certainly
a daunting task.
20The switch was not totally committing in the sense that it would have been possible, and at least early
on not terribly di¢ cult, to switch back into the REAG band. Nevertheless, there was a strong view at the
time that the EA licenses o⁄ered the best route to success.
23play over time. What the pattern of bidding highlights is that the auction game is similarly
complicated, and that the incumbent bidders who dominated the auction, not facing the same
challenging entry decision as SpectrumCo, may have devoted less resources to forecasting
￿nal prices early in the auction.
After shifting to the smaller licenses, SpectrumCo still faced an exposure problem, this
time the problem of putting together within its budget enough of the 176 EA licenses to have a
meaningful national footprint. faced another problem in completing a successful aggregation.
At the time, the budget theory indicated that the 50 MHz of EA and CMA licenses would
sell for a total in the vicinity of $6.5 billion, meaning that SpectrumCo could likely acquire
20 MHz nationwide, or 40% of the smaller licenses, for roughly $2.6 billion.21 For a new
entrant, however, it is the major markets that are essential for a successful aggregation. So
to minimize risk, and again control relative prices, SpectrumCo initially bid for 30 MHz in
the major areas, eschewing less valuable licenses. SpectrumCo then adopted a ￿steadfast￿
posture, strongly defending the 20 MHz B band licenses, while slowly allowing itself to be
bid o⁄the 10 MHz C band licenses and using the freed up eligibility to ￿ll in the non-major
market B band licenses.22
This strategy led to some interesting late auction decisions as the budget forecast was
borne out. One implication of the budget hypothesis, in its strictest form, is that a bidder
that reduces its bidding by a dollar will reduce total prices by a dollar. SpectrumCo was
looking to purchase roughly 40% of the EA and CMA spectrum, so when its high bid on a
license such as Lexington, KY was topped, conceding the license promised to save roughly
40% of the bid amount in spending on other licenses. At the same time, there was a strategic
reputational issue. A show of weakness might encourage another round of bidding on a
SpectrumCo license such as New York. With the large bid increments, such a development
could easily end up costing $50 million dollars. Balancing these considerations, SpectrumCo
maintained its steadfast posture, almost without exception, to the end of the auction.23
21While the exact size of SpectrumCo￿ s budget cannot be disclosed directly (and indeed was not known
precisely by its outside advisors at this point in the auction), Figure 6 shows its bidding topping out several
times around $2.5 billion.
22SpectrumCo ultimately purchased just one C block license, covering Dallas.
23There were only four markets priced at over $2 million in which Spectrumco did not acquire licenses ￿
St. Louis ($23.5 million), Cincinnatti ($21.9 million), Greenville, S.C. ($5.2 million), and Lake Charles, LA
($3.6 million).
24When the auction ￿nally ended, the REAG licenses had sold for an average of $.705 per
MHz-pop. The C licenses sold for $0.548. The 734 A licenses sold for $0.417.24 The B
licenses, on which SpectrumCo￿ s bids represented over 95 percent of the money spent, went
for $0.451. SpectrumCo acquired 20 MHz of spectrum covering virtually the entire country
for $2.378 billion (Figure 9). By contrast, the two largest bidders in the auction,Verizon
and T-Mobile, between them acquired 40 MHz for $6.99 billion.25 Overall, the average price
per MHz-pop paid by the four largest bidders in the auction apart from SpectrumCo ￿
Verizon, T-Mobile, Cingular and MetroPCS ￿ was $0.68 cents. Relative to that standard,
SpectrumCo saved more than $1.1 billion.
6 Conclusion
Keynes (1936) famously concluded in the General Theory, ￿Practical men, who believe them-
selves to be quite exempt from any intellectual in￿ uence, are usually the slaves of some de-
funct economist.￿But in the modern economy, particularly in ￿elds such as portfolio theory
and auction theory, the time to implementation has shrunk. Ideas developed by economists
have not only played a role in designing the market games that allocate many important
resources, but they also provide the insights necessary to play these games at the highest
level.
In the AWS auction, SpectrumCo￿ s ability to alter the relative pace of price increases of
the large licenses, combined with its ability to forecast ￿nal total prices, enabled it to take
two calculated risks. Its ￿bookends￿jump-bid strategy enabled it to discover that the cost of
assembling a national footprint using major REAG licenses would likely become more than it
was willing to pay. The strategy also forced SpectrumCo￿ s most direct competitor, Wireless
DBS, into making billion dollar decisions with just hours of notice. SpectrumCo￿ s ability to
forecast total auction revenue gave it the con￿dence that it could assemble a large number
24The low prices overall for the A licenses mask signi￿cant di⁄erences between the large and small markets.
For example, in the ￿ve top markets (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, and Philadelphia) the
B licenses were 21 percent cheaper than the A licenses (9 percent greater cost for areas covering 38 percent
more people) but in the remainder of the country the A licenses were roughly 15 percent cheaper.
25Verizon spent $2.81 billion almost exclusively on the REAG bands, paying an average price of $.731.
T-Mobile spent $4.18 billion, 70 percent on REAG licenses and half the rest on the two most valuable A
licenses (New York and Chicago). A collection of cheaper small licenses reduced its average cost to $.630.
25of smaller licenses into a national footprint within its available budget, making bidding on
these licenses a good calculated risk in spite of the exposure problem.
In the later part of the auction, SpectrumCo￿ s strategy of steadfast bidding on its network
of B licenses may have encouraged other bidders to devote most of their attention to other
blocks, although tactically other large bidders could have taken actions to raise SpectrumCo￿ s
costs. The net result was a national wireless footprint at a billion dollar discount relative to
competitor￿ s prices. While opportunities to achieve such successes are hard to come by and
the ￿ne details of every auction are di⁄erent, the experience suggests a value to economic
and game theoretic analysis in complex auctions.
26References
Ausubel, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom, ￿The Lovely But Lonely Vickrey Auction,￿in Cram-
ton, Shoham and Steinberg, Combinatorial Auctions, 2006.
Avery, Christopher, ￿Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions,￿Review of Economic
Studies, April 1998, 65(2), pp. 185-210
Brusco, Sandro and Guiseppe Lopomo. 2002. ￿Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous
Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complemen-
tarities,￿Review of Economic Studies, 69(1), pp. 1-30.
Cramton, Peter, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, Combinatorial Auctions. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.
Day, Bob and Paul Milgrom, ￿Core-Selecting Auctions,￿International Journal of Game
Theory, 36, 2008, 393-407.
Gul, Faruk and Ennio Stacchetti, ￿The English Auction with Di⁄erentiated Commodities,￿
Journal of Economic Theory, 2001.
Hegeman, John, ￿A Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Bidders with Budget Constraints,￿
Stanford Working Paper, 2008.
Keynes, John Maynard, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936.
Klemperer, Paul, ￿What Really Matters in Auction Design,￿Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 2002.
Milgrom, Paul, ￿Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction.￿
Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 108(2), pp. 245-72.
Milgrom, Paul, Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004.
Milgrom, Paul, ￿Package Auctions and Package Exchanges,￿Econometrica, 2007, 75(4),
pp. 935-966.
Rothkopf, Michael, "Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process is Not Prac-
tical," Operations Research, 2007: 55(2): 191-197.
Zheng, Charles. ￿Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous
Ascending Auctions,￿Iowa State Working Paper, 2006.
27Bidder Total Winning Bids MHz-Pops Price per MHz-Pop
SpectrumCo $2,377,609,000 5,267,189,470 $0.45
Cingular 1,334,610,000 2,436,458,880 $0.55
T-Mobile 4,182,312,000 6,638,718,070 $0.63
Verizon 2,808,599,000 3,840,952,220 $0.73
MetroPCS 1,391,410,000 1,445,444,020 $0.96
Four incumbents 9,716,931,000 14,361,573,190 $0.68
Table 1: Prices Paid by the Five largest Buyers in AWS Auction
Notes: (1) A MHz-pop is a standard unit for spectrum, with one unit meaning one 
MHz of bandwidth covering one person. (2) The high prices paid by MetroPCS reflect 
to some extent the fact that their licenses covered dense urban areas; these licenses 






5 PCS C Block May 1996 13,429 1.77
10 PCS C Block Re-Auction July 1996 697 1.50
11 PCS D,E,F Block Jan 1997 2,716 0.36
22 PCS March 1999 533 0.20
34 800 MHz Auction Sept 2000 337 0.18
35 PCS C&F Block Jan 2001 17,596 4.37
58 Broadband PCS Jan 2005 2,250 1.05
66 AWS Auction Sept. 2006 13,879 0.54
73 700 MHz March 2008 19,592 1.11






First round with 
Exp. ≥ 90% of 
Final Revenue
PWB/Final Revenue in 
First Round with Exp. ≥ 
90% of Final Revenue
22 78 6 0.49
30 73 14 0.52
33 66 11 0.16
34 76 20 0.41
35 101 12 0.21
37 62 6 0.16
44 84 21 0.82
53 49 11 0.33
58 91 4 0.38
66 161 10 0.25
Table 3: Exposure and Revenue Rise in Major Auctions
Note: PWB stands for "Provisionally Winning Bids" or current revenue 
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AT&T (Alaska Wireless/AT&T) Salmon PCS, LLC (Cingular)
Nextel Spectrum Acquisition Corp. VoiceStream PCS BTA I License Corporation
Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless Connectbid, LLC
Cook Inlet/VS GSM V PCS, LLC (T-Mobile) Leap Wireless International, Inc.
SprintCom, Inc. SVC BidCo, L.P.
Black Crow Wireless, L.P. DCC PCS, Inc.





























Wireless DBS LLC SpectrumCo LLC T-Mobile License LLC
Cingular AWS, LLC Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless MetroPCS AWS, LLC
Dolan Family Holdings, LLC Leap Wireless (Cricket/Denali)Figure 6: Ratio of Maximum Exposure 
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EA/CMA Licenses REAG LicensesFigure 9: SpectrumCo’s Purchases in AWS Spectrum Auction